"Institutionalization aversion” and the willingness to pay for home health care by Costa-Font, Joan
  
Joan Costa-i-Font  
"Institutionalization aversion” and the 
willingness to pay for home health care 
 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
Original citation: Costa-i-Font, Joan (2017) "Institutionalization aversion” and the willingness to pay 
for home health care. Journal of Housing Economics, 38. pp. 62-69. ISSN 1051-1377 
 
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2017.10.001 
 
 
Reuse of this item is permitted through licensing under the Creative Commons: 
 
© 2017 Elsevier 
CC BY-NC-ND 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/84647/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: November 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or 
other copyright owners. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
 
1 
 
“Institutionalization Aversion” and the 
Willingness to Pay for Home Health 
Care 
 
Joan Costa-Font 
Department of Health Policy, 
 London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact: Joan Costa-Font, London School of Economics, Houghton Street WC2A 2AE. 
E-mail: j.costa-font@lse.ac.ukl 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
 
Abstract  
We examine the presence of a systematic preference for independent living at old age 
which we refer as “institutionalization aversion” (IA). Given that IA is not observable 
from revealed preferences, we draw on a survey experiment to elicit individuals’ 
willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid institutionalization (e.g., in a nursing home), using a 
double-bounded referendum WTP format. Our results suggest robust evidence of IA 
and reveal a willingness to pay of up to 16% of respondent’s (individuals over fifty-five 
years of age) average income. We find that estimates of the willingness to pay to avoid 
institutionalization (or €292 at the time of the study) exceed the amount respondents are 
willing to pay for home health care at old age in the event of a mild impairment (€222). 
WTP estimates vary with income, age and especially, respondents’ housing conditions. 
Finally, we test the sensitivity of our estimates to anchoring effects and ‘yea-saying’ 
biases. 
 
Keywords: institutionalisation aversion, state-dependent preferences, home health care, 
willingness to pay, caregiving, referendum format. 
JEL: R21, I18.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The development of housing alternatives to institutional care for old age 
individuals (such as nursing home and assisted living) is not solely driven by its 
monetary costs. Important non-monetary considerations underpin such housing choices. 
Some evidence suggests a preference for ‘aging in place’ (McGarry and Shoeni, 2000), 
especially in the event of moderate or mild impairment. Part of the such a preference 
rests in the lower probability of returning home after entry into institutional care 
(Chaplin, 2009)1, as well as a behavioural primacy for ‘known’ environments 
(Kurnianingsih et al, 2015)2. However, in addition to future environmental and 
caregiving arrangements, we ascertain that housing choices at old age are determined by 
an additional behavioural explanation, namely:  a generalized preference for 
independent/non-institutionalised living. A preference for independent living in turn 
motivates a higher demand of home health care (Engelhard and Greenhalgh-Stanley, 
2010), and can ameliorate the probability of nursing home entry (Charles and Sevak, 
2005)3. 
It is far from trivial how best to empirically estimate people’s preference for 
independent living.  Revealed preferences over housing choices do not typically deliver 
such evidence, unless a specific field experiment is purposefully defined.  Evidence 
                                                 
1 Community transitions from nursing home to the community decline with time in nursing home, 
especially among male and unmarried, and 90% of such transition takes place in the first 90 days 
(Chaplin, 2009). Furthermore, as many as 12% of elderly people in the US is a low need and could 
transition back home but do not (Borscia, 2010). 
 
 
2 Consistently, older property owners (which relative to renters, less uncertainty on future housing 
arrangements), exhibit higher housing satisfaction (Costa-Font, 2013). 
3 A similar logic is used by Pauly (1990) who argue that individuals preferring to receive care from their 
children will decline to purchase insurance (and by doing so they increase the likelihood of them being 
cared for by their children but it could well simply reflect a behavioural reaction to avoid entering a 
nursing home).  
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from studies studying the subjective wellbeing of different housing alternatives at old 
age is fairly mixed and inconclusive. Donnenwerth and Petersen (1992) report a 
negative effect of institutionalization on subjective well-being. In contrast, Böckerman 
et al. (2011) find a higher subjective well-being among institutionalized individuals (in 
Finland), and Godoy-Izquierdo et al., (2013) uncover no significant difference between 
institutionalized and non-institutionalised individuals in Spain (Godoy-Izquierdo et al., 
2013). Nonetheless, those studies do not capture the potential constraints affecting 
peoples housing choices, and instead, they reveal peoples experienced utility of 
different housing alternatives (e.g., living in a nursing home). Hence, estimates should 
rely on alternative methodologies.  
 
Choice experiments, and more specifically on contingent valuation techniques 
that estimate individual’s willingness to pay, stands out as an alternative methodology 
to elicit the value of independent living at old age. WTP estimates can be elicited from a 
survey experiment following a referendum format that mimics a market mechanism 
(‘take it or leave it’). That is, assuming that an individual’s utility 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦, 𝐼𝐼) increases in 
wealth (y) and decreases with institutionalisation (I), and that I is discrete so that it takes 
the value of 1 (if institutionalised) or 0 (otherwise), individuals maximum willingness to 
pay can be represented as the amount rendering the individual indifferent between being 
institutionalised or not, that is 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦 −𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊, 0) = 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦, 1). This is the methodology used 
in this study. 
This paper examines the willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid institutionalization 
at old age (in the event of mild dependency), which we argue measures the individual 
specific value of ‘institutionalisation aversion’ (IA). Given that, as mentioned, IA is not 
just reflective of a preference to receive care at home, it cannot be inferred form housing 
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or caregiving choices, a choice experiment appears particularly adequate. Furthermore, 
it is likely that the magnitude of IA differs among all individuals.  
In our experiment, WTP estimates are elicited from both a single (SBDC) and 
double-bounded discrete choice (DBDC) formats (Haneman et al., 1991), and refer 
from a representative sample of Spanish urban population older over fifty-five. 
Although a double-bounded referendum format is recommended to mimic a market 
decision, it is not without its downsides, which include the presence of both anchoring 
(Herriges and Shogren, 1996), and ‘yea-saying’ effects, or a tendency of an individual 
to exhibit a lexicographic response to different bids (Holmes and Kraner, 1995). 
Alternative designs (such as payment cards) were deemed to be less realistic, and hence 
likely to bias the results. However, we devote a section to examine the presence of 
anchoring and other potential biases.  
Secondly, we estimate the WTP for home health care (in the event of mild 
dependency), and compare the estimates with the WTP to avoid institutionalization. The 
intuition behind our reasoning is that of the existence of a utility gain from being at 
home at old age4, which is dependent on an expectation of receiving care at home and in 
turn it is reflective of a more general preference for independent living5. Although we 
cannot test all of those connections, we attempt to contribute to shedding some light on 
estimating the value of independent living.  
Finally, we examine the empirical determinants of WTP estimates, which 
include in addition to the effect of income a number of context specific controls that are 
                                                 
4 This gain in part reflecting an individual preference for independent living which in other contexts is 
defined as a preference for an autonomous life (Frey and Stutzer, 2004), and here, would mainly refer to a 
preference for ‘more independence’ given the individual circumstances. 
 
5 Note that individual preferences may be state dependent. This is particularly the case when valuing care 
at old age because preferences may vary after health impairment. IA is hypothesized to vary 
systematically in different ways depending on the severity of an individual's health impairment because 
the degree of severity reduces the feasibly of home care. Thus, individuals would be expected to trade off 
their IA with the potential benefits from specialized nursing home care. 
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specific to the country where our survey experiment was conducted, namely in Spain.  
Evidence from Spain is important because it exhibits a higher than average preference 
for family caregiving and, at the time of the study, it offered limited public 
subsidization of long-term care services and supports (LTCSS)6. Furthermore, our 
sample refers to individuals over fifty-five years of age who have not been 
institutionalized7. Although our WTP estimates reveal ex-ante valuations before 
individuals face the choice of moving into institutional care, we can identify a number 
of potential determinants of institutionalization such as income, age, health status, 
housing quality and caregiving needs though there are important unobservable that are 
likely to drive individual preferences.  In addition, we control for regional-specific 
effects which in turn controls for some potential contextual effects8.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the data 
employed and the empirical specifications. Section 4 provides the results, and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 This section offers a simple theoretical background on the question of 
individuals' willingness to pay to avoid institutionalization (or institutionalization 
aversion). That is, an individuals’ IA can be elicited from the underlying maximum 
                                                 
6 Prices of home care services vary by region and can range between 1300-1700€/month. Similarly, and 
home care costs vary between 10 and 14€/hour and individuals typically receive an average of 18 hours a 
month.  
 
7 The reasons for such an age cut off are to study potential behavioural variation across age groups that 
are considering old age needs, but that is not on the verge of immediate admission to an institution. For 
comparative purposes, we estimate individuals’ WTP for home health care in the event of mild care 
impairment. 
8 In Spain, after 2007, a new long-term care bill expanded public provision of home health care for those 
in need and introduced a caregiving allowance. However, the data we employ here refer to 2006 data, 
before the new regulation was incepted. 
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amount an individual is willing to pay to avoid being institutionalized conditioned on 
other things being equal.  
Let us define the state-dependent utility function  as the utility when dependent 
outside an institution, and as the utility when dependent in an institution.  Let us 
assume that a shock can impair (mildly, or not severely) an individual to the extent that 
it could require institutionalisation is exogenous and measured by q (which refers to the 
probability of being impaired such that one can live at independently) and  refers 
to the probability that an individual requires nursing home care. Finally, let's assume w 
to refer to individual’s cumulative income. Then one can compute the expected utility of 
the two states of the world, and identify a value d (the maximum cumulative willingness 
to pay) to that will make individuals indifferent between living independently and in an 
institution as follows: 
 
𝑞𝑞𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑ℎ(𝑤𝑤) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑤𝑤) = 𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑ℎ(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑑𝑑)                                     (1) 
 
Notice, that d or the WTP to avoid institutionalisation is a payment is forgone (income 
sacrifice) which in our experiment we elicit in the form of a monthly amount (but that 
could be capitalized as a lump sum). That is, the cumulative amount the individual is 
indifferent between living in a nursing home but keep its income (w) if impaired with a 
probability q9, and living independently with a probability 1-q and a wealth of w-d.  
Hence, d can be labelled as the WTP to avoid institutionalization. By using first-order 
Taylor development around w, we have: 
 
                                                 
9 For simplicity, we assume that q is exogenous and that individual’s willingness to pay entails the price 
individuals are willing to pay to forgo the effects of q. One could assume q to vary by ill-health an 
endogenize q without a significant change in the equilibrium 
(.)dhu
(.)diu
)( q−1
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    𝑑𝑑 ≅ (1 − 𝑞𝑞) (𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑ℎ(𝑤𝑤)−𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑤𝑤)
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑ℎ(𝑤𝑤)/𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤                                      (2) 
That is, the WTP to avoid institutionalization (𝑑𝑑) is positive, if  >0 
which indicates a disutility from being institutionalized in the event of a moderate 
health impairment, assuming the marginal utility of income is positive. Furthermore, (2) 
reveals that the WTP to avoid institutionalization (d) decreases with 𝑞𝑞 and increases 
with wealth (w). The empirical analysis reported below will attempt to estimate the 
utility gain of living to live independently at old age by the income sacrifice (d) 
individuals are willing to forgo to avoid institutionalization. Finally, we will examine 
the determinants of such WTP, and more specifically, the effects of income, housing 
quality, and caregiving to adjust for alternative explanations for individuals WTP 
estimates.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Given that the private good nature of old age housing (and limited public 
subsidization) at the time of this study, we expect the WTP (d) in Equation (2) to reflect 
the value of independent living. Similarly, for comparative purposes, we aim to estimate 
the WTP for home health care, as it provides us with a magnitude with which to 
compare the value of IA. We model IA and estimate its magnitude by drawing upon a 
referendum WTP format. That is, the WTP to avoid institutionalization can be specified 
at the individual level as: 
 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑 = 𝑧𝑧𝑑𝑑𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑑𝑑                                           (3) 
 
 where the dependent variable is the ijWTP of the individual i, which varies with a set of 
characteristics 𝑧𝑧𝑑𝑑, which represents the vector of observed variables influencing 
)()( wuwu didh −
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individual WTP in addition to a random term iε . One of the observed characteristics 
refers to the bid in a referendum format, and hence the coefficient of such bid allows us 
to estimate the WTP given a specific (average) value of the remaining covariates. 
Nonetheless, in estimating the WTP magnitude, two different approaches are followed: 
a single format dichotomous choice (SBDC) and a double (multiple) formats (DBDC).  
 
2.1. Single-bounded dichotomous choice  
An individual’s (i) response to a contingent valuation question takes the form of 
a dichotomous choice – agreement or refusal to pay – for a given bid )( it . Given that it  
varies randomly across individuals, a contingent demand curve can be estimated using 
SBDC as an individual will accept a bid 1=iy  when ii tWTP >  so that: 
 
)Pr()1Pr( βεεβ iiiiiiii zttzzy −>=>+==      (4) 
 
Assuming  follows a normal distribution ),0( 2σN  then it is possible to write 
Equation (4) as: 
 
)//()1Pr( σσβ iiii tzzy −Φ==         (5) 
 
where (Φ ) is the standard cumulative normal distribution. If σδ 

/1−= and σβη 
 /=  
then [ ]δηβ  /~),~( −′== zzWTPE , where z~  is the vector of the average value of the 
characteristics of interest. The WTP becomes: 
 
iε
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0
)ˆ(ˆ
β
βαµ X+−=

        (6)
 
 
Where  captures the coefficient on the bid amount. 
 
2.2. Double-bounded dichotomous choice 
Given that a dichotomous response offers limited precision in computing the 
average WTP, particularly in a small-scale sample (as ours), it is possible to estimate 
the magnitude for equation (2) by drawing on additional second dichotomous question 
to obtain additional information to improve the efficiency of the estimation, or double-
bounded dichotomous choice (DBDC) (Hanemamn et al., 1991). Similar strategies have 
been used in several previous studies (Clark, 2000; Liu et al., 2000). That is, if the 
individual accepts the first bid, then a second question asks for the WTP for a higher 
bid. Similarly, if the respondents reject the first bid, the second question asks for the 
WTP for a lower amount. This implies that each individual i is asked two questions 
j=1,2 which we identify in the superscript, and therefore the bid offered )( jit will now 
produce two dichotomous responses 1it  and 
2
it . Thus,  
)//(
)//(),Pr()1,1Pr(
2
1221121
σσβ
σσβεβεβ
tz
tztzztzyy
i
iiiiiiii
−Φ−
−Φ=>++≤===
     (7) 
 
whereas before (Φ ) is the joint bivariate normal distribution BVN (0,0,1,1, 𝜌𝜌) (7) can 
be expanded to incorporate all response combinations and can be estimated using a 
bivariate probit model where captures the correlation of the error terms of the two 
choice estimates (see Cameron and Quiggin, 1994 for further reference). Finally, upon 
acceptance or rejection, a final open-ended question was formulated. As is conventional 
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in this type of exercises, the survey contained an extra follow-up question whereby 
individuals could state the reasons for their specific response. In this way, it was possible to 
identify those who supplied a protest response and produce robustness estimates 
accordingly.  
 
2.3. Choice characteristics  
In addition to the experiment’s bid, we consider a set of characteristics 
controlling for the individual’s health and disability, housing characteristics, income, 
proxies for housing quality and family composition. Table A in the appendix provides a 
list of the set of independent variables considered and the expected effect. Among the 
different variables considered we include household income and proxies of housing 
quantity given that monetary equivalent measures of value are expected to vary with 
people’s income and wealth.  Similarly, given that caregiving can be informally 
provided within the household we condition our estimates on measures of family 
composition, and specifically the presence of children in the family. Furthermore, we 
are able to observe whether individuals co-reside with their spouse. Finally, we include 
a number of controls for housing quality which can affect WTP to be institutionalized 
such as housing satisfaction, the square meters of the dwelling and an attitudinal 
covariate capturing whether the individual willingness to change dwelling.  
 
2.4. Anchoring effects 
Given that previous research has found that a double-bounded WTP can produce 
inconsistencies between first and second responses, leading to a conservative bias in 
estimating WTP values (Banzhaf et al., 2004; Watson and Ryan (2007), we examine 
further the presence of anchoring effects between the first and second bid. More 
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specifically, we regress the second WTP choice (bound) against the first one and the bid 
in the first bound to produce consistent estimates between the first and second bid as 
follows:   
 
11
i
2   WTP)1( tWTPi γγ +−=                               (8) 
   
if 𝛾𝛾 = 0 it would be suggestive of no bias. Estimates of 𝛾𝛾 that differ from zero 
would be suggestive of anchoring or ‘yea-saying' effects. Anchoring effects result when 
the probability of accepting the second bind decreases with the acceptance of the first 
bid. Alternatively, if the probability of accepting the second bid if found to increase 
with the acceptance of the first bid, it would be suggestive of ‘yea-saying’ behavior. The 
parameters are estimated using a random effects probit model.  
 
3. DATA AND METHODS 
 
3.1 The data 
 
The data employed in this study draws from an experimental survey developed 
after being piloted and pre-tested to identify potential inconsistencies (see for instance 
Johnston et al, 2016 for standard recommendations). The experiment was divided into 
two sections. The first section referred to general preferences for long-term care 
services and attitudes towards housing at old age. Then a second section conducted a 
contingent valuation exercise to elicit the individuals WTP to avoid institutionalization 
as well as their WTP for home health care in the event of a mild impairment. Most 
participants had limited direct experience in receiving care at the time of the survey. As 
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mentioned, the WTP design simulates a referendum (or market) choice scenario suitable 
to elicit preferences for privately purchased goods such as care for old age individuals. 
Referendum formats include either single- or multiple-bounded offers, and are deemed 
adequate to elicit preferences when revealed preferences are not directly observable 
from market transactions (e.g., as it’s the case of institutionalisation aversion), but when 
a market environment is particularly suitable to the decision context (e.g., individuals 
are typically not used to pay for care), and hence elicitation mechanism is incentive 
compatible. Otherwise, one of the common problems with such a technique is the 
presence of hypothetical bias (values might not reflect those in an actual choice). 
 
The original experiment involved 300 participants above 55 years of age who 
answered all WTP questions and is representative of Spanish cities with a population of 
over 30,000 inhabitants. The data was retrieved during 2004 but it was not made 
available for research and validation until a few years later in 2008. Interviewers were 
specifically trained for the type of questionnaire designed. Respondents were all over 55 
years of age, and the survey responses were computerized and as expected in WTP 
studies, refer to consequential value questions that change a status quo (e.g., by 
reducing the risk of institutionalization in the event of a mild impairment). Although 
many WTP studies in the literature exhibit some level of non-response, our non-
response rate in the WTP exercise was not a significant concern given that when an 
individual was not available, it would be randomly replaced. The questionnaire 
measures a number of covariates including household composition, demographics, 
household income, health status a number of questions on housing quality and 
characteristics following recommendations (e.g., Johnston et al, 2016). The 
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questionnaire was designed to warm up respondents with general attitudes to family and 
caregiving which allowed respondents to focus on the study context.  
Old age individuals (those over 65 years of age) in Spain make up 17% of the 
total population and about 33% of the old age over 80 years of age reveal two or more 
ADLs. At the time of the study, 15.5% were receiving institutional care, and 60% of 
these were in privately funded nursing homes (IMSERSO, 2008). Caregiving subsidies 
were provided by local authorities on the basis of some form of means/needs test by 
using a regionally heterogeneous scale based on income and wealth (mainly housing 
assets), and objective personal assessments of individual needs. Furthermore, current 
income of elderly dependents such as respondents to our survey experiment exceeds the 
country average (IMSERSO, 2008). 
 
Our survey experiment includes a section on attitude questions. Attitudes 
indicate that 49.8% of respondents prefer aging in their own place (having direct access 
to health care) in the event need; this percentage drops (increases) to 45% in the event 
of severe dependency. Similarly, when individuals were asked where they would want 
to live if they had some form of mild dependency; 96% answered at their own place, 
consistently with previous research documenting a preference for “aging in place” in 
Spain (Costa-Font et al, 2009). However, such percentage is lower (51%) under severe 
dependency. In such a scenario, 34% of respondents prefer to live in a nursing home. 
Other forms of housing at old age appear to such as adaptable housing are less common 
(less than 5% of the population).  
 
3.2 Methods 
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To better describe the survey experiment, we describe below the exact questions 
used to elicit an individual’s WTP to both avoid institutionalization and for home health 
care. The latter is particularly important for comparative purposes to estimate whether 
the demand for home health care captures the entire preference for not-being 
institutionalized. As described, we use both a single and a double bound referendum 
format, alongside a follow-up question as described below (assuming the costs to the 
individual remain unaltered by the institutionalization status):  
 
a) WTP to avoid institutionalization (IA): 
“In the event of suffering some form of mild impairment, would you be willing to 
pay ## (e.g., €60*) monthly to avoid entering a nursing home if receiving equivalent 
care without being institutionalized (without an additional cost of care to you)? (* bids 
may be €60, €120, €300, or €600, and follow-up questions range from €30 to €1200)” 
 
b) WTP for home health care: 
“In the event of suffering some form of mild impairment, would you be willing to 
pay ## (e.g., €60*) monthly to receive help with your daily activities (e.g., bathing, 
cleaning, shopping, toileting, etc) at home.? (* bids may be €60, €120, €300, or €600, 
and follow-up questions range from €30 to €1200)” 
 
To gain further insights into the meaningfulness of the estimates, we included an 
auxiliary question requesting how much each respondent was willing to pay as an open-
ended question. When the answer to the follow-up question was still nil, then the 
respondent was asked to state the reasons for not being willing to pay anything.  
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We estimate (1) using both a DBDC and SBDC. Our regression estimates 
include in a first instance a basic set of controls for demographics, income, household 
size alongside health-related needs, and after, they are expanded to include a larger 
number of controls for housing quality. One of the pitfalls of our survey design is that 
we cannot identify if the spouse of the respondent is institutionalized too. This is a 
limitation insofar as for those respondents, their WTP estimates are also affected 
institutionalization or disability. However, such an omission, if anything would bias 
downwards our individuals IA estimates. Furthermore, the bias is attenuated by the fact 
that the average respondent in our sample would not be at an age range individuals are 
typically institutionalized unless it refers to their spouse. Another concern is that a 
handful of respondents only report a measure of WTP for one of such WTP questions 
and not the others. Some (small) difference might emerge between samples sizes across 
them. Nonetheless, we further formally test whether non-respondents to some of the 
questions differ in any different in observed covariates to respondents, and we did not 
found evidence of a significant difference at 5% level.  
 
 
4. RESULTS 
We first report the summary statistics of the survey experiment as an additional 
form of quality assurance. Given its significance, we first examine the proportion of 
non-respondents as well as those unwilling to pay to avoid institutionalization alongside 
their reasons.  On average, we find that only 30% would not be prepared to pay 
anything to avoid institutionalization, and conversely, at the opposite end, 7% would be 
prepared to pay up to €1200 monthly. Out of those not being prepared to pay anything, 
21% would genuinely not want to pay anything whilst 38% stated that they could not 
afford it, and the remaining 38% provided a number of responses that including that 
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their children would take care of them, their children would move in with them (hence 
institutionalisation would be very unlikely), or it was too early for them to think about 
it, either suggestive of some level of risk denial, or a protest response. Thus, 70% of the 
population exhibited some degree of IA which is consistent with the hypothesis of the 
paper, namely that IA is not equally perceived by everyone. Next, we examine results of 
the WTP exercise. 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics containing both responses to first and 
second bounds of the WTP contingent questions for both avoiding institutionalization as 
well as WTP estimates for home health care in the event of moderate health impairment. 
Consistently with DBDC experiment rationale, we find that the acceptance rates of 
second bids are lower than first bids for both questions.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
A significant aspect to check when using contingent valuation data is whether 
individuals should be sensitive to the bid amount. This is specifically important to 
validate whether IA is indeed a generalized feature, and how sensitive it is to potential 
trade-offs with income. More generally, if living independently is indeed a valued good 
dimension in itself, WTP estimates should be higher for those individuals who value 
independence more (conditioned on income). As expected, our estimates are suggestive 
of a declining WTP pattern for higher bids (prices). Table 2 summarises the responses 
of first and second bids for both WTP to avoid institutionalization (IA) and home health 
care 
18 
 
 A priori expectations that probability bid acceptance would fall as the bid 
increased were confirmed for all bids. Indeed, for the first bound responses, we 
observed a monotonic decline in the number of those accepting the offered bid (which 
differed across individuals). As expected, changes in the bids close to the average WTP 
were small. In contrast, when the bids were far from the average WTP (e.g., €600), we 
find was a sharp decline in the number of bid acceptances in the following lower bid.  
However, even when we evaluate the WTP for high bids, almost one-quarter of the 
sample was still willing to pay the offered amount to obtain home health care in the 
event of a moderate impairment.  
 
When we turn to examine second bounds (second discrete choices), we again are 
able to distinguish accepted and rejected bids. Rejected bids increased when the bid 
value increases, but unlike the first bound, they stagnated when a second bid dropped to 
€60, and after that, rejections did not increase. The latter suggests that the closer the bid 
becomes to nil, the more likely it is that the proportion of non-respondents reflects those 
who are insensitive to the bid10. Consistent with the first bid, when examining bid 
acceptance, we find that it declines when the bid exhibited a higher value. Thus, 
respondents, as expected, are sensitive to the magnitude of different bids and their 
responses are reflective a lexicographic order. Such a consistency is reflective of that 
fact that at the time of the survey, families of the respondents are likely to have some 
experience of similar services and are generally able to picture the utility gains of the 
defined scenarios.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
                                                 
10 Since numbers in each row adds to total in the last column, we can infer the numbers of the respondents 
accepting the bid for each value of bid from the column labelled " the second bid”. 
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In the presence (absence) of some yea-saying, the expectation is that the WTP estimates 
elicited through DBDC should be higher (lower) than the SBDC WTP estimates. We 
find that estimates of an SBDC indicate larger WTP values11.Importantly, in both probit 
model and a bivariate probit specifications, we obtain comparable estimates for both IA 
and WTP for home health care. The Rho (ρ) coefficient, which estimates the correlation 
terms between the error terms of the two probit specifications, suggests a negative 
correlation, which is confirmed by lower WTP, and likelihood ratio tests suggest that 
the unrestricted bivariate probit is preferable as restrictions of an alternative 
specification are rejected.  
 
Estimates of the WTP to avoid institutionalization for the entire sample are 
reported in Tables 3a and 3b. We condition on bid amount (€), individual characteristics 
(health needs, respondents age, and gender of the respondent) and household variables 
(income and number of rooms) that may influence the results alongside measures of 
housing quality and probit and bivariate probit estimates are provided in Table 3a and 
Table 3b. The theoretical validity of the WTP estimates can be tested by checking 
whether regression coefficients report values that are consistent with the expected 
results as both the bid and respondent’s income are significant determinants of WTP. 
We expect income to be positive and significant, the bid to exert a negative and 
significant effect, similarly, we expect a negative effect of the availability if substitutive 
care (e.g., informal care), and a positive effect of variables capturing the effect of needs 
(e.g., health status). Age does capture the effect of cohort effects, and we expect IA and 
                                                 
11 When we test whether first and second bounds have similar means, by using a standard t-test, which 
confirms that we can reject the null hypothesis of equality at 5% significance level 
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the WTP for home health care to vary with age, health status and some measures of 
housing conditions.  
 
When institutionalization estimates are compared across different specifications, 
we find evidence suggestive of no significant difference when employing probit and 
bivariate probit using information on the first bound. Indeed, probit estimates with 
controls provide an estimate of €292.3, and the average bivariate probit estimates are of 
€292.7. WTP is found to increase with age and it peaks at the ages of 70–79 years 
Finally, the number of rooms increase the WTP to avoid institutionalization. From 
marginal effect estimates, we can compute the average price and income elasticities for 
IA. More specifically, we estimate a price elasticity value of  – 0.412 (0.098) and an 
income elasticity estimates value of 0.65 (0.181). Thus, individuals’ sensitivity to price 
seems reasonably small, and income elasticity estimates indicate that independent living  
or IA, rather than being a luxury good, appears to be a primary necessity.  
 
[Insert Table 3a and 3b about here] 
 
Table 4 reports the estimates of the WTP for home health care in the event of moderate 
health impairment. The implicit assumption respondents might make is that home care 
is the alternative to going to an institution. However, and consistently with the paper’s 
hypothesis, WTP estimates are higher for IA than for home health care suggestive that 
the demand for home health care is one potential mechanism to avoid 
institutionalization but not the only one (e.g., informal care, tele care etc).  Table 4 
provides the estimates of the willingness to pay for both avoiding institutionalization 
(IA) and home health care under three specifications: first column (4.1) reports the 
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estimates SBDC specification without controls which suggests an estimate of the WTP 
of about 308 € for IA and 250 for home health care. When the willingness to pay is 
estimated using a bivariate probit we estimate a lower WTP, especially for home health 
care with and without controls. When WTP to avoid institutionalization, estimates are 
compared with individuals’ income, we find that on average respondents are willing to 
give up 16% of their income to guarantee that they will not be institutionalized in the 
event of mild dependency. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Finally, we examine the consistency of the first and second bound estimates, as 
well as the follow-up estimates alongside the reasons for potential corner solutions (e.g., 
protest responses). That is, we study how individuals respond to WTP questions, and 
specifically whether they anchor their second responses to their first and second bound 
in a simple way. This can be explored by regressing WTP in the first and second bound 
in addition to the first bid as in equation (8). A significant coefficient of the constant 
term indicates that individuals’ responses differ across bounds, in the form of negative 
anchoring or the so-called ‘yea-saying'. Importantly, Table 5 suggests evidence of some 
anchoring for IA estimates that might exert a moderate positive influence between 
bounds consistent with ‘yea-saying'. However, the effect is only significant for IA and 
not for the WTP for home health care. Nonetheless, given the magnitude of the 
coefficient, we estimate a negligible bias in our estimates.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper puts forward a behavioural explanation for the expansion of the 
demand for home health care at old age, namely a systematic preference for independent 
living which we conceptualize as ‘institutionalisation aversion (IA)’. Given that IA at 
old age cannot be estimated from revealed preferences, we estimate the value of 
independent living by computing the individual willingness to pay (WTP) to both avoid 
institutionalization and for home health care using a survey experiment on individuals 
over 55 years of age. WTP is elicited from both a single and double bounded 
referendum format (‘take it or leave it'). 
Our findings suggest consistent evidence of a preference for independent living 
at old age, or what we refer to as IA after a moderate health impairment.  More 
specifically, we find that the WTP to avoid institutionalization is of a magnitude 
equivalent to 16% of respondent’s average income (€292) which significantly exceeds 
the WTP for home health care (€222). Hence, we confirm that IA reflects more than just 
a preference for home health care. Although we find some evidence of ‘yea-saying', our 
WTP estimates are consistent with the desirable properties of monetary equivalent 
preferences, namely, they increase with income and proxies of wealth (e.g., house size), 
and don’t vary with health status and household size. Finally, given that our experiment 
took place in Spain before the introduction of universal caregiving supports and 
subsidies for long-term care in 2007, our WTP estimates are unlikely to be distorted by 
the introduction of subsidies.  
An important finding to stress is that the quality of housing and home health 
care, are significantly associated with WTP estimates. Hence, it seems important to 
understand how IA vary across countries to evaluate the external validity of our 
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results12. All things considered, evidence of individuals’ aversion to institutionalization 
(AI) helps to explain an underlying preference for ‘aging in place’ (Eurobarometer, 
2007; Costa-Font et al, 2009), as well as the expansion of the demand for caregiving 
alternatives that allow an independent life at old age. Furthermore, our results provide a 
behavioural explanation for the deinstitutionalization process taking place in European 
societies (European Commission, 2015). Finally, evidence of a preference for 
independent living at old age, suggests that policy efforts should concentrate on 
ensuring the suitability of housing (such as an early adaptation of homes to the 
requirements of care and limited mobility) at an older age, as well as ensuring the 
availability  and affordability of home health care. 
 
.  
 
 
  
                                                 
12 For instance, it is possible if family caregiving duties are strong (such as in Spain), WTP estimates 
become ‘conservative estimates'. In contrast, in countries, where caregiving duties are weak, one would 
expect WTP estimates are les likely to be biased by unobserved covariates. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics – Variable name, definition, means and 
standard error 
Variable Definition Mean 
(Std. Err) 
Dependent variables 
res1ai Acceptance of the first bid – WTP to avoid institutionalisation 
(IA) 
0.51 
(0.028) 
res2ai Acceptance of the second bid – WTP to avoid 
institutionalisation (IA) 
0.34 
(0.027) 
res1sb Acceptance of the first bid – WTP for home health care in 
event of mild impairment 
0.44 
(0.029) 
res2sb Acceptance of the second bid – WTP for home health care in 
event of mild impairment 
0.29 
(0.026) 
Bid variables  
Bid1ai Average first bid (€) to avoid institutionalisation (IA) 293.5 
(11.68) 
Bid2ai Average second bid (€)to avoid institutionalisation (IA) 328.8 
(17.02) 
Bid1ss Average first bid (€) 
to access home health care in event of mild impairment 
227.19 
(9.06) 
Bid2ss Average second bid (€) to access home health care in event of 
mild impairment 
145.7 
(7.03) 
Control variables 
Income Income (€) (‘Capacity to pay control’) 853.6 
(46.78) 
Married  
Co-res 
Married co-resident respondent =1 0.653 
(0.027) 
Health Self-assessed health (1-10) (‘Care need proxy’) 7.443 
(0.102) 
Age 
group 
Age in year groups (‘Demographic control’) 2.87 
(0.098) 
Gender Gender (2=Female) (‘Demographic control’) 1.638 
(0.03) 
Numb 
rooms 
Number of rooms (‘Housing quantity’ /’wealth proxy’) 3.406 
(0.07) 
Housing 
Statisfacti
on 
 
Housing satisfaction (1-10) (‘Housing quality proxy’) 8.023 
(0.092) 
Change 
Dwelling 
 
Would you like to change dwelling (‘Housing quality proxy’) 0.263 
(0.025) 
Square M Square meters of the dwelling 103.03 
(3.492) 
 
Note: This tables provides the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the analysis. It contains 
both the four dependent variables considered in the study alongside the four bids in (€) corresponding to 
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the respective regression exercises. Finally, we include in the regression a list of potentially relevant 
controls such as income (key to verify the validity of the WTP exercise), self-reported health (important 
in the event of state dependent preferences), age in year groups, gender and the number of rooms (to 
control for property characteristics and wealth effects).  The table contains the survey names and 
definitions as well as the mean and sample standard error of each variable.  
 
Table 2.  Bid distribution of first and second bound referendum willingness to pay 
(WTP) to avoid institutionalisation and home health care in the event of mild 
dependency at old age 
 
 
 WTP to avoid institutionalisation 
 
Second Bid(€) 
First 
Bid(€) 30 60 180 360 600 1200 Total 
60 23 0 54 0 0 0 77 
180 0 36 0 42 0 0 78 
360 0 0 42 0 32 0 74 
600 0 0 0 49 0 22 71 
Total 23 36 96 91 32 22 300 
 WTP for home health care 
 
Second Bid(€) 
First 
Bid(€) 30 60 180 360 600 1200 Total 
60 25 0 52 0 0 0 77 
180 0 37 0 41 0 0 78 
360 0 0 50 0 24 0 74 
600 0 0 0 55 0 16 71 
Total 25 37 102 96 24 16 300 
 
 
Note: The table shows the number of respondents accepting a bid to avoid institutionalisation at old age in 
the event of a mild health impairment. Results show the bid in € and the n numbers of the respondents 
given each bid (X) for both avoiding institutionalisation and home health care. We report the number of 
observations of each bid followed by the total per bid.  
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Table 3a. Willingness to Pay to Avoid Institutionalisation (IA)  
 
  (3.1) Probit 
– SBDC 
(3.2)  
Bivariate Probit- DBDC 
(3.3)  
Probit – 
SBDC 
(extra 
controls) 
(3.4) Bivariate Probit- 
DBDC (extra controls) 
 
 
       
Bid1ai  -0.0022*** -
0.0027*** 
- -
0.0026*** 
-
0.0027*** 
- 
 (0.00043) (0.00044)  (0.00053) (0.0005)  
Bid2ai  - - -
0.0019*** 
- - -
0.0018*** 
   (0.00034) 
 
  (0.00048) 
Income 4.08e-
06*** 
4.36e-
06*** 
2.58e-
06*** 
3.69e-
06*** 
3.90e-
06*** 
1.91e-
06*** 
 (7.24e-07) (7.18e-07) (6.18e-07) (8.37e-07) (8.44e-07) (6.76e-07) 
Gender 0.0208 0.0118 -0.0465 -0.000271 -0.00700 -0.0473 
 (0.178) (0.177) (0.163) (0.206) (0.207) (0.192) 
Married  0.548* 0.553* 0.566*  0.564 0.343 
 (0.328) (0.314) (0.306)  (0.357) (0.362) 
Age55-60 0.861** 0.813** 0.966*** 0.493 1.048*** 0.907** 
 (0.349) (0.334) (0.321) (0.310) (0.395) (0.387) 
Age60-65 0.666** 0.580* 0.832*** 0.111 0.645* 0.565 
 (0.332) (0.319) (0.309) (0.282) (0.367) (0.367) 
Age65-70 0.374 0.350 0.604* -0.119 0.452 0.459 
 (0.384) (0.371) (0.352) (0.363) (0.438) (0.434) 
Age70-80 0.386 0.358 0.159 -0.226 0.331 0.0767 
 (0.371) (0.370) (0.358) (0.372) (0.446) (0.451) 
Health 0.139*** 0.148*** 0.153*** 0.120** 0.122** 0.130** 
 (0.0476) (0.0465) (0.0435) (0.0580) (0.0575) (0.0551) 
Numb rooms 0.163** 0.178*** 0.0529 0.432*** 0.435*** 0.0163 
 (0.0691) (0.0675) (0.0681) (0.144) (0.143) (0.118) 
Square M - - - -3.33e-05 0.000308 0.000608 
    (0.00277) (0.00278) (0.00235) 
Change 
Dwelling 
 
- - - 0.172 0.218 0.178 
    (0.241) (0.241) (0.223) 
Housing Statis 
 
- - - -0.0574 -0.0506 0.0148 
    (0.0684) (0.0686) (0.0650) 
Constant -1.902** -1.843** -1.508** 3.525 3.592 -0.687 
 (0.765) (0.800) (0.695) (1.843) (1.851) (1.028) 
       
31 
 
Pseudo-R2 0.2394   0.2897   
Observations 296 296 296 296 296 296 
Note: This table provides both SBDC and DBDC estimates of the probability of accepting a referendum 
format WTP offer to avoid institutionalisation in event of mild dependency. Estimates are robust 
estimates and include regional fixed effects. *** Refers to at least 1% significance ** Refers to at least 
5% significance, .* Refers to at least 1% significance We report model marginal effects, standard errors in 
parenthesis and t-values. 
 
Table 3b. Willingness to Pay for home health care (HH)  
 
 
  (3.5) Probit – 
SBDC 
(3.6)  
Bivariate Probit- DBDC 
(3.7)  
Bivariate Probit- DBDC 
(extra controls) 
      
      
Bid1sb -0.00277*** -0.00274*** - -0.0029*** - 
 (0.000451) (0.000455)  (0.000466)  
Bid2sb - - -0.00105**  -0.0018*** 
   (0.000427)  (0.000455) 
Income 3.76e-06*** 3.77e-06*** 2.03e-06*** 3.80e-
06*** 
2.79e-
06*** 
 (7.11e-07) (7.10e-07) (6.05e-07) (7.05e-07) (6.38e-07) 
Gender 0.166 0.173 -0.0697 0.199 -0.0651 
 (0.180) (0.180) (0.178) (0.180) (0.176) 
Married 0.161 0.147 0.615* 0.143 0.582 
 (0.313) (0.313) (0.365) (0.311) (0.357) 
Age55-60 0.191 0.192 0.612 0.186 0.665* 
 (0.331) (0.331) (0.383) (0.329) (0.374) 
Age60-65 -0.294 -0.287 0.851** -0.284 0.759** 
 (0.320) (0.320) (0.364) (0.319) (0.359) 
Age65-70 -0.242 -0.233 0.628 -0.188 0.550 
 (0.373) (0.372) (0.404) (0.369) (0.396) 
Age70-80 0.0299 -0.000701 0.317 0.0278 0.290 
 (0.360) (0.363) (0.414) (0.361) (0.404) 
Health 0.105** 0.106** 0.0230 0.113** 0.0477 
 (0.0474) (0.0475) (0.0457) (0.0475) (0.0455) 
Numb rooms 0.231*** 0.228*** 0.100 0.231*** 0.150** 
 (0.0689) (0.0689) (0.0677) (0.0680) (0.0682) 
Constant -0.907 -0.934 -1.689** -0.938 -1.551** 
 (0.749) (0.751) (0.760) (0.761) (0.743) 
      
Pseudo-R2 0.2408     
Observations 296 293 293 293 293 
Note: This table provides both SBDC and DBDC estimates of the probability of accepting a referendum 
format WTP for home health care (HH) in event of mild dependency. Estimates are robust estimates and 
include regional fixed effects. *** Refers to at least 1% significance ** Refers to at least 5% significance, 
.* Refers to at least 1% significance We report model marginal effects, standard errors in parenthesis and 
t-values. 
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Table 4. Willingness to pay (WTP) estimates (€) to AI and home health care (HH)  
 
 
(4.1)  
SBDC 
(4.2)  
DBDC 
(4.3)  
DBDC -Controls 
WTP -IA 308.2 300.0 292.3 
(s.e) (40.8) (50.5) (41.2) 
WTP -HH 250.0 213.3 222.2 
s.e (37.6) (33.7) (34.6) 
Note: This table provide the estimates of the willingness to pay for both avoiding institutionalisation (IA) 
and home health care under three specifications: first column (4.1) reports the estimates of single bounded 
discrete choice (SBDC) specification, hence assuming there is only one bound form a probit model. The 
second column (4.2) reports the estimates of the first bound of a bivariate probit using a double bounded 
discrete choice (DBDC) framework. The third column (4.3) reports the estimates of the WTP adjusting 
for a number of controls included in Table 3a and Table3b.  
 
 
Table 5. Anchoring effects for the second discrete choice (WTP1) 
 
Institutionalization Aversion (IA) 
 
marg eff (s.e) 
t1 -0.0008** (0.00018) 
WTP1 0.0003** (0.0001) 
Likelihood Ratio 20.7 
 Pseudo R2 0.05 
 WTP for home health care (HH) 
t1 -0.0004** (0.0002) 
WTP1 0.00003 (0.0001) 
Likelihood Ratio 8.16 
 Pseudo R2 0.02 
 Note:  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Expected coefficients 
  
 Variable Institutionalization 
Aversion /WTP home 
health care 
Independent variables   
Demographics and Health 
Status 
Health Status, Age, 
gender, current health 
impairment 
+/- 
Income Self-reported 
income 
+ 
Informal Caregiving 
Availability 
Household 
members, cohabitation, 
 
Control variables   
House 
characteristics 
Number of rooms, 
square meters, housing 
satisfaction, change 
dwelling, square meters 
+ 
 
